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Book Review
The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines, and Mental Representation,
2nd edition, by Tim Crane. New York: Routledge, 2003. xi + 259 pages including preface, glossary,
chronology, notes, and index. ISBN 0415290317 ($22.95).
Tim Crane’s The Mechanical Mind is an introduction to contemporary philosophy of mind. What makes
this book interesting is that Crane did not simply outline recent theories in philosophy of mind. Instead,
Crane chose to explain the problem of mental representation, and in the process “examine the questions
about the mind which arise when attempting to solve this problem in light of dominant philosophical
assumptions” (p. 1). The assumption that gets the most ink is the view Crane calls “the mechanical
view.” Most contemporary philosophers of mind hold a mechanical view of the mind. The mechanical
view says that the mind is a causal mechanism that behaves in predictable ways. There are, however, at
least two questions that arise with regard to the mechanical view. First, if a mind is simply a mechanism,
how can it have thoughts and mental representations? Second, if a mind is simply a mechanism, how can
it be conscious? Crane devotes the first five chapters to the first question. In chapter six, he discusses the
second.
In the first chapter, Crane introduces the philosophical problem of representation. This problem is
easily described. How can something represent something else? Crane discusses both pictorial
representation and linguistic representation. He argues that these kinds of representation require
interpretation and that interpretation derives from mental representation. He writes, “My own view
is that mental representation – the representation of the world by states of mind – is the most
fundamental form of representation” (p. 13).
Chapter 2 deals with questions surrounding thinkers and their thoughts. Crane considers two
important questions: (1) how do we know about the mind? and (2) what do we know about the
mind? Crane suggests that the answer to the first question lies in what he calls “common-sense
psychology.” Common-sense psychology—more commonly called “folk psychology”—is the “idea
that when we understand the minds of others, we employ (in some sense) a sort of ‘theory’ which
characterizes or describes mental states” (p. 62). So, we know about other people’s mind by using
common-sense psychology to explain their behavior. Crane then argues that we can answer the
second question by determining what common-sense psychology says about the mind. On this
Crane writes, “As I interpret common-sense psychology, it says (at least) that thoughts are states of
mind which represent the world and which have effects in the world” (p. 80).
The third chapter is concerned primarily with the following question: “Can a computer think? Or,
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more precisely, can something think simply by being a computer?” (p. 84). In order to answer this
question Crane begins by explaining what a computer is. He suggests that a computer is a thing that
processes representations in a systematic way. He then considers whether Artificial Intelligence (a
thinking computer) is possible. Crane considers Hubert Dreyfus’ critique of AI and John Searle’s
‘Chinese room’ argument. Crane concludes that AI is impossible. He writes, “Nothing can think
simply by being a computer” (p. 128).
Chapter 4 attempts to answer the question, “Is the human mind a computer? Or, more precisely, are
any actual mental states and processes computational?” (p. 84). Although related to the question of
Chapter 3, the question of chapter four is a distinct question. As Crane points out, although
something cannot think simply by being a computer, it is still possible that some of our thought is
computational. In order to show how our thoughts could be computational, Crane discusses the
debate between the Mentalese hypothesis (also called language of thought hypothesis) and
connectionism.
The fifth chapter is most dense chapter of the book. It returns to the problem of mental
representation. Crane discusses the possibility of a reductive definition of mental representation. A
reductive definition would be of the form:
X represents Y if and only if ________
Any definition of this form is a reductive definition. It attempts to reduce the concept of
representation to other terms. Crane argues that there have not, as yet, been any successful reductive
theories of mental representation because all attempts thus far have had not adequately dealt with
the problems of error. An additional problem for reductive theories deals with their inability to
account for certain kinds of mental content. Crane writes, “Reductive theories of representation
have to be able to account for all kinds of mental content, not just the simple kinds connected with
(say) food and reproduction. But they have as yet provided no account of how to do this” (p. 208).
To avoid the kinds of problems mentioned in the preceding paragraph, Crane offers a non-reductive
theory. He writes, “The non-reductive answer to the question, ‘What is a mental representation?’
would be given be given by listing the ways in which the concept of representation figures in the
theory” (p. 207). So for Crane, mental representation is a theoretical notion. A theoretical notion is
“a notion whose nature is explained by the theories in which it belongs” (p. 170).
The final chapter deals with the problem of consciousness. That is, how can a mechanical view of
the mind account for consciousness? In this chapter, Crane discusses the problem of qualia and
some objections to physicalism. Crane suggests that the problem of consciousness give further
credence to the claim that reductive theories do not work. He writes:
Perhaps the proper lesson should be that we should try and be content with and
understanding of mental concepts – representation, intentionality, thought and
consciousness – which deals with them in there own terms, and does nor try to give
reductive accounts of them in terms of other sciences (p. 231).
The main strength of The Mechanical Mind is its accessibility. Crane does an excellent job of
clearly explaining difficult concepts; one need not have any prior knowledge of philosophy or
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psychology to make sense of this book. Additionally, the book serves as a good introduction to the
philosophy of mind. In the course of his discussion, Crane introduces a number of important ideas
in philosophy of mind like the mind/body problem and qualia. Both students and general readers
will benefit from this book. I recommend The Mechanical Mind to anyone looking for an
introduction to the problem of mental representation, and even to those making a first foray into the
field of philosophy of mind.
Benjamin A. Gorman
Temple University
